Habit Formation: A Kind of Prudence? by Seckin, Aylin
Montréal
Octobre 2000
Série Scientifique
Scientific Series
2000s-42
Habit Formation:
A Kind of Prudence?
Aylin Seckin
CIRANO
Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le
financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-
membres, d’une subvention d’infrastructure du ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, de
même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche.
CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and
research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the
Ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, and grants and research mandates obtained by its
research teams.
Les organisations-partenaires / The Partner Organizations
•École des Hautes Études Commerciales
•École Polytechnique
•Université Concordia
•Université de Montréal
•Université du Québec à Montréal
•Université Laval
•Université McGill
•MEQ
•MRST
•Alcan Aluminium Ltée
•AXA Canada
•Banque Nationale du Canada
•Banque Royale du Canada
•Bell Québec
•Bombardier
•Bourse de Montréal
•Développement des ressources humaines Canada (DRHC)
•Fédération des caisses populaires Desjardins de Montréal et de l’Ouest-du-Québec
•Hydro-Québec
•Imasco
•Industrie Canada
•Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc.
•Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton
•Ville de Montréal
© 2000 Aylin Seckin. Tous droits réservés. All rights reserved.
Reproduction partielle permise avec citation du document source, incluant la notice ©.
Short sections may be quoted without explicit permission, provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.
ISSN 1198-8177
Ce document est publié dans l’intention de rendre accessibles les résultats préliminaires
de la recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions.
Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l’unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne
représentent pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires.
This paper presents preliminary research carried out at CIRANO and aims at
encouraging discussion and comment. The observations and viewpoints expressed are the
sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of CIRANO
or its partners.
Habit Formation: A Kind of Prudence?*
Aylin Seckin†
Résumé / Abstract
Dans cet article, nous avons examiné la relation entre la formation
d’habitudes et le concept de prudence de Kimball. En utilisant d’abord le modèle
de deux périodes de Kimball, nous avons démontré que la formation d’habitudes
mène à une prime de prudence plus élevée et une plus grande épargne
précautionnelle, pourvu que l’individu ait une prudence absolue décroissante.
Nous avons ensuite développé le modèle afin d’investiguer la relation entre
prudence et formation d’habitudes dans un sytème à multiples périodes. Nous
avons démontré que, même s’il n’y a pas de formation d’habitudes, la prime de
prudence n’est pas positive sauf si la propension marginale à la richesse est
constante. Par la suite, nous avons trouvé qu’il n’est pas possible de conclure,
même dans le cas d’une fonction d’utilité avec une simple formation d’habitudes,
que les habitudes augmentent ou diminuent la prime précutionnelle à la Kimball
quand il y a de multiples périodes.
In this paper we have examined the relationship between habit formation
and Kimball’s concept of prudence. Using first, Kimball’s two-period model we
have shown that habit formation leads to a larger prudence premium and greater
precautionary saving, provided that the individual has decreasing absolute
prudence. Then, we have extended the model to investigate the relationship
between prudence and habit formation in a multi-period framework. We have
shown that, even when there is no habit formation, the prudence premium is not
unambiguously positive unless the marginal propensity out of wealth is constant.
Then we have found that it is not possible to conclude, even with the utility
function exhibiting a simple form of habit formation, that habits increase or
decrease the precautionary premium ’’in the sense of Kimball’’ when there exists
multiple periods.
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habit formation: a kind of prudence?
1. INTRODUCTION
It has been argued by Deaton [4] that habit formation leads to a behavior akin
to prudence. The validity of this notion depends on the denition of concept of
prudence. This was Kimball [11] who rst introduced the concept of prudence to
characterize the sensitivity of a decision variable to income risk. He argues that
income risk leads to precautionary saving when the individual has non-increasing
absolute risk aversion. Kimball and Weil [12] extended Kimball's analysis to
Kreps-Porteus preferences.
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The early literature on individual precautionary saving is associated with Le-
land [13]. In his analysis of the theory of precautionary saving, he has shown that
whenever we depart from the certainty equivalence (CE) framework by allowing
the utility function to be time-separable and have a positive third derivative, an
increase in labor income uncertainty will reduce current consumption and change
the slope of the consumption function when insurance markets are not complete.
In a two-period model with a deterministic interest rate, Sandmo [15] shows that
if current consumption is a normal good and temporal risk aversion is decreasing,
saving is higher under uncertainty.
2
However, if the interest rate is stochastic but
income is deterministic he shows that the response of saving to risk is ambiguous.
The subsequent literature associated with Miller [14], Sibley [17] and Schechtman
[16] generalizes the earlier two-period models' results to arbitrary multiple periods
model.
In this paper, we will modify Kimball's model by introducing habit formation
in consumption choices, a type of non-separability in preferences, to examine the
impact of such an assumption on the prudence measure and mathematically verify
the validity of Deaton's argument. In a two-period model, we will show that habit
formation leads to a larger prudence premium and greater precautionary saving,
provided that the individual has decreasing absolute prudence. Then, we will
investigate the relationship between prudence and habit formation in a multi-
period framework. We will show that, even when there is no habit formation, the
prudence premium is not unambiguously positive unless the marginal propensity
out of wealth is constant. Next, we will prove that it is not possible to conclude,
even with the utility function exhibiting a simple form of habit formation, that
habits increase or decrease the precautionary premium in the sense of Kimball
when there exists multiple periods.
The implications of habit formation were rst discussed in Duesenberry [5]'s
work. His proposition was that families are willing to sacrice saving in order to
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protect their living standards. In the event of a fall in income, consumption will
not fall proportionately, producing a ratchet eect.
Whereas time-separable preferences imply that current utility depends only
on current consumption, time-non-separable preferences with habit formation im-
ply that past real consumption patterns and levels form consumer habits which
persist long enough to reduce the eects of current income changes on current
consumption. For a given level of current expenditures, past purchases contribute
to a habit stock. Hence, it is an increase of current consumption over and above
the habit stock which raises current utility.
An increase in current consumption in response to an increase in wealth or
permanent income has two eects: it increases current utility, holding habit stock
xed; but (everything else equal) decreases utility at t+ 1. Since increasing con-
sumption today generates a future externality, the rational consumer will respond
to an increase in wealth or permanent income with a more moderate increase
in consumption. In the presence of habit formation, an increase in current con-
sumption increases the marginal utility of future consumption. There is thus, an
adjacent complementarity in consumption.
Recent empirical papers in the consumption literature have argued for the role
of habits in determining consumption. Constantinides [3], Ferson and Constan-
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tinides [8], Dynan [6], Carroll, Overland and Weil [2], Heaton [10], Fuhrer and
Klein [9] are among others.
In section 2, we will rst introduce habit formation into the Kimball's two-
period model of optimal consumption-saving, in which we examine the prudence
measure. In section 3, we will extend the relationship between prudence and habit
formation in a multi-period framework by using induction method. We will rst
examine the last two periods and calculate the prudence premium for this specic
period. We then repeat the analysis for the initial period t to nally prove for any
period j: Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. KIMBALL'S MODEL WITH HABIT FORMATION
In Kimball's model, the consumer makes an optimal consumption-saving decision
subject to a risky second period income. Since the preferences are time-non-
separable in consumption, the current utility will depend not only on current
consumption but also on the habit stock, x
t
. The habit formation parameter  is
the degree to which the habit stock aects current utility and it is between zero
and one. Habit stock x
t
is a weighted average of all past consumptions and can be
dened as x
t
 (1 )
P
1
j=0

j
c
t 1 j
; where weights add to one with (1  ) being
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the depreciation parameter of habits, 0 6  6 1: When the depreciation of habits
is equal to one, ( = 0); i.e., the case where past values of consumption before
c
t 1
do not aect the habit stock, we have a model which reects one-period
habit formation, i.e. x
t
= c
t 1
: For simplicity, we will assume this one-period
habit formation in this paper. When we introduce habit formation in this model,
the optimization problem becomes:
Max
c
1
v(c
1
  c
0
) + Ev(ec
2
  c
1
) (2.1)
s.t. c
1
= y
1
  s
1
ec
2
= s
1
R + ey
2
Dene c
t
as time t consumption, y
t
as time t income, s
t
as time t saving,
R  1+r where r is the real interest rate,  is the habit formation parameter, 0 <
 6 1; a tilde indicates a random variable. E(:) denotes expectations conditional
on the information available at period one. Consider a two-period utility function
v(c
1
) + v(c
2
) where v is increasing and concave and  is the discount factor.
The rst order condition is:
 v
0
(y
1
  s

1
  c
0
) +  (R + )Ev
0
(s

1
R + ey
2
  y
1
+ s

1
) = 0 (2.2)
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Denition (1)  is the precautionary premium, i.e., the amount of income
such that if the individual has Eey
2
  with certainty he or she chooses the same
level of optimal saving s

1
when facing the risk. That is:
 v
0
(y
1
  s

1
  c
0
) + (R + )Ev
0
(s

1
R + ey
2
  y
1
+ s

1
) (2.3)
=  v
0
(y
1
  s

1
  c
0
) + (R + )v
0
(s

1
R + Eey
2
    y
1
+ s

1
)
Taking a second order approximation of the left-hand side (LHS) and a rst
order approximation of the right-hand side (RHS) around Eey
2
; and solving for
the prudence premium , we get:


=
1
2

2
y
 (2.4)
where 
2
y
is the variance of income and  is the prudence measure:


=
 
v
000
(s

1
R + Eey
2
  (y
1
  s

1
))
v
00
(s

1
R + Eey
2
  (y
1
  s

1
))
(2.5)
Proposition (1) The impact of habit formation on prudence is determined ac-
cording to whether the individual has decreasing, constant or increasing absolute
prudence. If absolute prudence, ; is decreasing with an increase in the second
6
period income then labor income uncertainty will raise the marginal propensity
to consume at a given level of consumption. Under the hypothesis of decreasing
absolute prudence (DAP), habit formation makes the individual more prudent:
since the prudence premium is higher, precautionary saving increases with habit
formation. On the other hand, if there is increasing absolute prudence, then labor
income uncertainty will lower the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth at
a given level of rst period consumption. Under the hypothesis of increasing ab-
solute prudence (IAP), habit formation makes the individual less prudent towards
the uncertainty of income, and thus the precautionary savings against income un-
certainty will be lower.
Proof.
Taking the derivative of the prudence measure with respect to the habit for-
mation parameter ; we obtain:
d
d
= c

1
[v
00
v
0000
  (v
000
)
2
]
[v
00
]
2
(2.6)
We can also express (??) as the change in the precautionary measure with the
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change in the net expected second period consumption:
d
d
=  c

1
d
dbc
2
where bc
2
is the net expected consumption in the second period,
bc
2
= E(ec
2
  c
1
)
Therefore,
d
dbc
2
6 (>) 0)
d
d
> (6) 0:
An important example of DAP is the exponential utility function. Note that
with a quadratic utility function v
000
= 0 so that the prudence premium is zero.
Therefore, we conclude that under the hypothesis of decreasing absolute prudence,
habit formation increases precautionary saving.
3. PRUDENCE IN AN INFINITE HORIZON PROBLEM
In this section we extend the analysis to an innite horizon problem. The indi-
vidual faces a stochastic income stream fy
t
g which is i:i:d: The sequence of real
interest rate is known with certainty. We assume that current utility depends on
8
lagged consumption in a general form, as captured by the non-separable utility
function U(c
t
; c
t 1
): The utility function is continuous, concave in its arguments
and has a positive third derivative:
U(0) =1; U
0
> 0; U
00
< 0; U
000
> 0:
The value function of the innite horizon problem is the limit function of a se-
quence of value functions fV
n
(W; c)g. The dynamic programming problem has
become:
V (W
t
; c
t 1
) = Max
W
t+1
;c
t
fU(c
t
; c
t 1
) + E
t
V (W
t+1
; c
t
)g (3.1)
s.t. : W
t+1
= R
t+1
(W
t
  c
t
) + ey
t+1
Solving for the prudence premium  as in the two-period case:


=
1
2

2
y
[( 
V
www
R
t+1
V
ww
R
t+1
  V
cw
) + (
V
cww
V
ww
R
t+1
  V
cw
)
| {z }
;
] (3.2)
where  is the measure of prudence. Hence, habit formation introduces a second
term in the precautionary premium. It also modies the denominator of the rst
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term. In what follows we will attempt to determine the sign of each term. In
order to determine the signs of the derivatives of the value function V
ww
; V
cw
;
V
www
; and V
cww
we proceed by induction. We rst examine the last two periods of
a nite horizon T period problem. We then make the induction assumption and
nally consider the initial period t.
3.1. THE LAST TWO PERIODS
Denition (2) V
T
(W
T
; c
T 1
) as the value with zero periods to go (i.e. for the
last period) and identical to the last period utility level, U(c
T
; c
T 1
); since last
period consumption is equal to the wealth available in the last period.
The value function with one period to go is then:
V
T 1
(W
T 1
; c
T 2
) = Max
fW
T
;c
T 1
g
U(c
T 1
; c
T 2
) + E
T 1
V (W
T
; c
T 1
)
s.t. : W
T
= R
T 1
(W
T 1
  c
T 1
) + y
T
(3.3)
Denition (3) The optimal decision rule for consumption is, c
T 1
; is a func-
tion of current wealth and lagged consumption, c
T 1
 g(W
T 1;
c
T 2
):
In order to determine the signs of the derivatives of the value function V
ww
;
V
cw
; V
www
; and V
cww
; we take the derivatives of the value function for the period
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T   1 with respect to its state variables W
T 1
;wealth level in period T   1 and
c
T 2
, consumption in period T   2:
Proposition (2) Even in the time-separable preferences case, the prudence
premium for the last two period is only unambiguously positive if the marginal
propensity to consume out of wealth is constant.
Proof.
First, we take the second derivative of the value function for period T  1 with
respect W
T 1
:
@
2
V
T 1
(W
T 1
)
@W
2
T 1
= E
T 1
[(R
T 1
)
2
@
2
U(c
T
)
@c
2
T
(1 
@g
@W
T 1
)] (3.4)
This derivative is negative by the concavity of the utility function and since the
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth,
@g
@W
T 1
; is less than one.
Taking the third derivative of the value function for period T   1 with respect
W
T 1
:
@
3
V
T 1
(W
T 1
)
@W
3
T 1
= E
T 1
[(R
T 1
)
3
@
3
U(c
T
)
@c
3
T
(1 
@g
@W
T 1
)
2
 (R
T 1
)
2
@
2
U(c
T
)
@c
2
T
(
@
2
g
@W
2
T 1
)] (3.5)
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The innite horizon prudence measure without habit formation, 
0
; will be the
ratio of these two derivatives:

0
=  
E
T 1
n
R
T 1
U
000
(1 
@g
@W
T 1
)
2
  U
00
(
@
2
g
@W
2
T 1
)
o
E
T 1
U
00
(1 
@g
@W
T 1
)

0
will be greater than zero if the following condition holds:
R
T 1
( 
U
000
U
00
) >
 (
@
2
g
@W
2
T 1
)
(1 
@g
@W
T 1
)
2
(3.6)
Since the third derivative of the utility function is positive by assumption,
U
000
> 0; under decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion and since the con-
cavity of the utility function implies that U
00
< 0; the sign of the third derivative
of the utility function with respect to wealth will be positive. Then the prudence
premium is only unambiguously positive if the marginal propensity to consume
out of wealth is constant, i.e. if
@
2
g
@W
2
T 1
= 0: This completes the proof.
3

Therefore, the individual must be suciently prudent with respect to period
T consumption risk for him or her to be prudent with respect to wealth risk. This
comes from the fact that the prudence premium is only unambiguously positive if
the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is constant. Then, for the last
12
two periods case, we can write the sucient condition for the third derivative of
the value function with respect to wealth to be positive under no habit formation
specication is the following:
 
@
3
U
@c
3
T
@
2
U
@c
2
T
>
 (
@
2
g
@W
2
T 1
)
(1 
@g
@W
T 1
)
2
(
1
R
T 1
):
3.1.1. ONE-PERIOD HABIT FORMATION
Now, let us consider the specic functional form that we have used in the section
2, namely U(c
t
  c
t 1
) and repeat the same procedure to nd the signs of the
derivatives of the value function with respect to its state variables.
Then the value function for one period before the last period is as follows:
V
T 1
(W
T 1
; c
T 2
) = Max
W
T
;c
T 1
U(c
T 1
  c
T 2
) + E
T 1
V (W
T
; c
T 1
)
s.t. : W
T
= R
T 1
(W
T 1
  c
T 1
) + y
T
(3.7)
Taking the derivative of the value function for period T  1 with respect to W
T 1
;
wealth in period T   1 :
@V
T 1
(W
T 1;
c
T 2
)
@W
T 1
= E
T 1
R
T 1
@U(W
T
; c
T 1
)
@c
T
(3.8)
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where we have the identity of:
@U
@c
T

@V (W
T
; c
T 1
)
@W
T
Now recall that the next period's wealth is dened as:
W
T
= (R
T 1
(W
T 1
  g(W
T 1;
c
T 2
) + y
T
)
and the optimal decision rule c
T 1
being a function of current wealth and lagged
consumption:
c
T 1
= g(W
T 1;
c
T 2
):
Next, we take the derivative of the left-hand side of (??) with respect to its state
variables c
T 2
and W
T 1
respectively to obtain:
@
2
V
T 1
(W
T 1;
c
T 2
)
@W
T 1
@c
T 2
= E
T 1
R
T 1
@g
@c
T 2

 
@
2
U
@c
2
T
R
T 1
+
@
2
U
@c
T
@c
T 1

(3.9)
This derivative is positive since the term
@g
@c
T 2
; which shows to what extent cur-
rent consumption is aected by lagged consumption, is positive: Habit formation
implies that the higher the previous period's consumption, the higher has to be
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the current period's consumption level in order to guarantee a positive utility
level.
Then taking the derivative of (??) with respect to W
T 1
:
@
2
V
T 1
(W
T 1;
c
T 2
)
@W
2
T 1
= E
T 1
R
T 1
U
00
[R
T 1
  (R
T 1
+ )(
@g
@W
T 1
)] (3.10)
(??) is less than zero and the value function is concave in wealth if the following
holds:
@g
@W
T 1
<
R
T 1
R
T 1
+ 
(3.11)
i.e. if the marginal propensity to consume is not too large. Since lagged consump-
tion increases current consumption due to habit formation, the denominator of
the precautionary premium  is also negative.
Recall that the precautionary premium with habit formation is equal to:


=
1
2

2
y
( 
V
www
R
t+1
+ V
cww
V
ww
R
t+1
  V
cw
)
Now, in order to determine the magnitude and the sign of the numerator of the
precautionary premium under habit formation, we take the derivative of (??) with
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respect to W
T 1
to obtain:
@
3
V
T 1
(W
T 1;
c
T 2
)
@W
3
T 1
= E
T 1
R
T 1
f[(R
T 1
)
2
U
000
(1 
@g
@W
T 1
)
2
]
 [R
T 1
U
00
@
2
g
@W
2
T 1
] + [R
T 1
( U
000
)(1 
@g
@W
T 1
)(
@g
@W
T 1
)]
+[
2
U
000
(
@g
@W
T 1
)
2
] + [( U
00
)(
@
2
g
@W
2
T 1
)]g (3.12)
Then, this derivative is positive if the two conditions hold:
 Condition 1

1 
@g
@W
T 1

2
R
2
T 1
+ 
2
(
@g
@W
T 1
)
2
>
(
@
2
g
@W
2
T 1
)
U
00
U
000
[R
T 1
+ ] + 

1 
@g
@W
T 1

R
T 1
 Condition 2
(
@g
@W
T 1
) <
R
T 1
[R
T 1
+ ]
Condition 2 implies that the marginal propensity to consume has to be not
too large for the third derivative of the value function to be unambiguously
positive with habit formation.
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Since (??) is positive because lagged consumption increases current consump-
tion,
@g
@c
T 2
> 0; the rst term in the precautionary premium which is equal to
@
3
V
T 1
@W
3
T 1
@
2
V
T 1
@W
2
T 1
R
T 1
 
@
2
V
T 1
@W
T 1
@c
T 2
is positive.
Next, to nd out the sign of V
wwc
; we take the derivative of (??) with respect
to c
T 2
:
@
3
V
T 1
(W
T 1;
c
T 2
)
@W
2
T 1
@c
T 2
= (
@g
@c
T 2
)E
T 1
R
T 1
[R
T 1
( U
000
)(1  2
@g
@W
T 1
)
 (R
T 1
)
2
U
000
(1 
@g
@W
T 1
) + 
2
U
000
(
@g
@W
T 1
)]
 fE
T 1
@
2
g
@c
T 2
@W
T 1
[U
00
(R
T 1
)
2
  R
T 1
( U
00
)]g (3.13)
First, note that the term
@
2
g
@c
T 2
@W
T 1
is negative and shows the extent to which
the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is aected by lagged consump-
tion. Since lagged consumption increases current consumption, the rst term in
braces is negative if :
 Condition 1: The third derivative of the utility function is positive. This
holds by assumption.
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 Condition 2: The marginal propensity to consume out of wealth,
@g
@W
T 1
; is
not too large and being less than
R
T 1
R
T 1
+
.
Since the term
@
2
g
@c
T 2
@W
T 1
is negative,
@
3
V
T 1
(W
T 1;
c
T 2
)
@W
2
T 1
@c
T 2
is negative too: There-
fore, the second term in the precautionary premium which is equal to:
@
3
V
T 1
@W
2
T 1
@c
T 2
@
2
V
T 1
@W
2
T 1
R
T 1
 
@
2
V
T 1
@W
T 1
@c
T 2
is also positive. The rst step of the induction proof indicates that under the
assumed utility function U(c
t
  c
t 1
); habit formation results in an additional
precautionary premium.
3.2. THE INITIAL PERIOD t
After proving that the prudence premium is positive with habit formation for the
last two periods, we will proceed the analysis by the induction method.
Proposition (3) Under the induction assumption, the following inequalities
hold:
@
2
V
t
@W
t
@c
t 1
> 0;
@
2
V
t
@W
2
t
< 0;
@
3
V
t
@W
3
t
> 0;
@
3
V
t
@W
2
t
@c
t 1
< 0; and
@
3
V
t
@W
t
@c
2
t 1
> 0:
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Proof.
Writing the value function as for period t:
V
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Calculating the rst order condition with respect to c
t 1
, and taking its com-
plete dierentiation with respect to c
t
; c
t 1
and W
t
gives us:
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From (??) we can calculate the eect of lagged consumption on optimal con-
sumption rule
@g
@c
t 1
as:
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(3.15)
The eect of lagged consumption on optimal consumption is positive by the habit
formation assumption.
Similarly calculating the exact term for the marginal propensity to consume
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out of wealth,
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; we obtain:
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(3.16)
The marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is positive based on the
assumptions about the utility function.
Taking the derivative of the current period value function with respect to
current wealth, we nd:
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Then, taking the derivative of (??) with respect to c
t 1
:
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(??) is greater than zero since the eect of lagged consumption on optimal
consumption is positive by the habit formation assumption, i.e.
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@c
t 1
> 0.
Unfortunately, the signs of:
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are ambiguous and cannot be determined on the basis of the induction assumption.
(See Appendix for the exact expressions).
It is therefore not possible to conclude even by restricting the utility function to
the form U(c
t
 c
t 1
) that habit formation increases the precautionary premium
in the sense of Kimball when there exists multiple periods.
On the other hand, if there were no habit formation, the precautionary pre-
mium will be unambiguously positive if and only if:
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conrming the result that has been proven for the last two periods. That is, the
prudence premium is unambiguously positive if and only if the marginal propensity
to consume out of wealth,
@
2
g
@W
2
t
= 0; is constant. Thus, the individual must be
suciently prudent with respect to period t+1 consumption risk in order to have
a positive precautionary premium.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have examined the relationship between habit formation and
Kimball's concept of prudence. Using rst, Kimball's two-period model we have
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shown that habit formation leads to a larger prudence premium and greater pre-
cautionary saving, provided that the individual has decreasing absolute prudence.
Then, we have extended the model to investigate the relationship between pru-
dence and habit formation in a multi-period framework. We have shown that, even
when there is no habit formation, the prudence premium is not unambiguously
positive unless the marginal propensity out of wealth is constant. Then we have
found that it is not possible to conclude, even with the utility function exhibiting a
simple form of habit formation, that habits increase or decrease the precautionary
premium in the sense of Kimball when there exists multiple periods.
Notes:
1.Subsequently, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger [7] further explored the implica-
tions of the link between risk aversion and prudence.
2.Let U(c
1
; c
2
) denote the two-period utility function where c
t
is consumption at
time t=1,2. Sandmo assumes that
 @
2
U=@c
2
2
@U=@c
2
is decreasing in c
2
and increasing in
c
1
. He denes this condition as decreasing temporal risk aversion.
3.However, according to Carroll and Kimball [1], consumption function is gen-
erally a concave function of wealth. This implies that the marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth decreases in wealth, that is the term
@
2
g
@W
2
T 1
is negative in
general. Two exceptions include the exponential utility function when the interest
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rate is deterministic but income is random, and the constant relative risk aversion
utility function when income is deterministic while the interest rate is random.
APPENDIX
Taking the derivative of (??)with respect to c
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By taking the derivative of (??) with respect to c
t 1
we nd:
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respectively.
The third derivative of the value function for period t with respect to its state
variable W
t
is the following:
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